Two Things:

For those interested in Kierkegaard's realms, Walker Percy's The Last Gentleman is absolutely worth a read (no pun intended). Percy, a Christian and a big fan of Kierkegaard's, plants a main character squarely inside each realm, and leaves the protagonist to agonize over which to ground himself in. There's an interesting struggle with how passive the leap to the religious realm is, with one character insisting he must be acted upon by the absolute (and ending up in pretty sad shape).

Also, to get us ready:

(From Maira Kalman's The Principles of Uncertainty)

Ignorance and Incomprehensibility

I'm intrigued by Kierkegaard's system for reasons that conflict - it seems there's a tenuous balance of faith and knowledge at play here. I'm always curious to hear reasons for aligning with Christianity, especially when the Christian in question is highly esteemed in the intellectual world. My interest in this text specifically stems from the mix of approaches to understanding the world, the divine, and how the two inform one another; historically prominent religious themes, like blind "faith" and denial of the possibility of any understanding, come together in such a complex way here.

It's fascinating that Kierkegaard validates a sort of ignorance by way of illumination. The goal of Fear and Trembling is to remind Christians that their faith is not that of Abraham's, but individuated faith, and, in most cases, faith that's mediated by the universal, ethical realm. Most are not connected directly to God, and may not ever be. And if such a connection does occur, the individual won't have knowledge of it or the responsibility of acting under it until "called upon," or something comparably passive on the part of the individual. And, in fact, we can't recognize others who have been called upon and therefore joined the religious realm, because they can't tell us about it. That concept swallowed and flagged with regular reminders, so as not to stray back to correlations that shouldn't be made, how should one proceed about one's daily activities? Or one's faith, for that matter?

Kierkegaard says: don't worry! In terms of duty, those who've been pulled into absolute relation with the absolute have much more pressing moral concerns than those still occupying the ethical realm. For AMUs (Aesthetes Mediated by the Universal), duty is to other individuals, through the ethical. In other words, be morally commendable, and be ready in case of an opportunity to join the religious realm. And in the case of dealing with those who may have acted outside the ethical realm (like Abraham), we should proceed as we would with other rule-breakers. So we AMUs are really practicing a form of intentional ignorance by way of acknowledgement of incomprehensibility - but all this post-Kierkegaardian illumination.

The moral: Ignorance is okay, if you know you're doing it.

class and morality

During these weeks reading on Nietzsche the section that caught my attention was in section 10 when Nietzsche talks about happiness in relation to classes in society. He uses Greek society as his example. The issue here is one that comes out is “resentment”. Nietzsche says that resentment comes as a result of the lack of happiness. The man of resentment, says Nietzsche, “is neither upright nor naïve nor honest and straightforward with himself. His should squints; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything convert entices him as his world, his security, his refreshment.”

From this we see that the lower class is constantly seeking for his happiness, and therefore looks at others in resentment of their happiness. As a result, Nietzsche goes onto explain, that because the lower class has adopted this nature of resentment, and self-centeredness these attributes come to be a subject of pride among the lower class. This means that “cleverness” becomes an attribute in high commodity. However, this means that those who are among the class of resentment never achieve happiness as long as this resentment exists.

However, what Nietzsche also so says is that the noble classes are born into a world where their happiness is predisposed to them. He says on pg.38, “The “well-born” felt themselves to be the “happy”; they did not have to establish their happiness artificially by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that thy were happy.” It seems that here we have the crux of the situation and I am inclined to believe that Nietzsche is taking Marx concept of dialectical materialism a step farther. Now, not only is it the means of production that determine our place, and our abilities in society, but also it seems that what Nietzsche is suggesting here is that it determines our morality.

Nietzsche states quite clearly that it is those in society without good financial standing that are those who being to covet what others have, and judge their own selves based on others. As we have seen Nietzsche goes on to state that this leads to cunning and deception being very useful attributes in this lower society. Therefore now that these attributes have becomes useful, they are employed. Once they are employed we see that this society is one that becomes immoral by our standards. However I am not certain that this is not just a harkening back to some thinkers of the modern era who said that what was moral was no more than what was useful (social contract theory) However, I suppose we will find out in class tomorrow this is just a bit I found interesting about the text.

The Death of the Aesthete

Kieerkegaard ‘s three realms, the aesthetic, ethical, and absolute, create a rather simple structure to the lives we all lead. It also comes as no surprise that this structure is inviting and easily applicable to many people from all walks of life. You have one realm, the aesthetic, in which the singularly private sphere exists, then the ethical realm which is increasingly and completely public to all (making our world as understandable as possible for everyone), and an absolute realm in which exists another private sphere, between the individual and God.

It seems to me that Kierkegaard may have purposefully explained them in the order in which he did, but not for the obvious hierarchical reasons (i.e. God prevails over universals which prevail over individuals). For me, Kierkegaard’s system works more like this: you must first completely understand yourself (self-awareness and complete self-confirmation), then you must enter the universal ethical realm, in which you may begin to make more sense of yourself in relation to others and the world with which you interact, and then and only then can you understand the religious realm of the absolute. Now, as we have learned, the aesthetic and absolute realms are exceptions to the universal realm, in that the universal realm does not dictate or define any actions in these realms.

The heart of my concern lies with the aesthetic realm and the absolute realm, while the issue that initiates my concern is the ethical realm. In Abraham’s world, it would seem that he was in a place, as we have said in class, where a suspension of the ethical realm seems possible (perhaps Abraham had been through all that needed to be done within the aesthetic realm—he may have truly known himself outside of the universal).

Today, it seems like we (not to generalize, but to generalize anyway) seem to practice religion within the ethical realm and have no comprehension of a realm outside of it: no awareness of an absolute realm. We learn little of ourselves aesthetically, but much of ourselves ethically. Being universally defined by a universal realm is more prevalent and a loss of true self-identity is not preserved. Without this progression through the realms that Kierkegaard gives us, no true connection in the absolute realm can be made. As he says, true faith is practiced privately as something you do, not something you have. As we continue to publicize faith and religion more and more, we lose insight into ourselves in order to progress through the universal and into the absolute. Perhaps the key to religion lies within first knowing ourselves privately, then universally with others, and then and only then can we truly have faith in a realm outside of the ethical.

In a nutshell: one cannot practice faith in the ethical realm and still be legit.

Potential Challenges for Nietzsche

In the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche reveals that questions about the origins of good and evil have haunted him since childhood. Extending this early curiosity, he begins to raise doubts about some of our most basic moral assumptions. In particular, he questions a supposition than I’m sure most of us share—that the good man, the moral man, is of greater value than the evil man (20). He considers the possibility that such suppositions have been nothing more than ill founded, yet contagious, ideas that have polluted human thought for centuries.

In the preface, he doesn’t go much further than simple consideration. However, presumably he wants to say, “yes, this is all that morality is.” I’m guessing that by the book’s end, his conclusion will be a more developed version of this extremely bleak picture. However, in ultimately making this claim (and again I am only predicting that he will), it seems that there are several other controversial claims that are going to have to be made.

First of all, he is going to have to argue that there is nothing better about the good, in itself, than the bad, in itself. In other words, he’ll have to convince his readers that goodness has no inherent value, because if it does then the assumption he is questioning is obviously correct. The good man is more useful than the bad one, because goodness is simply better than badness.

In addition to this challenge, he’s going to have to prove that our species has no biological ties to the good. He’s going to have to show that there is nothing inherent in us, humans, that makes us feel a certain way about the things we categorize as good. If there is—for instance, if the fuzzy feeling we get from helping someone in need is a result of nature rather than a product of nurture—then his inquiry is doomed. For if this is the case then, regardless of any brilliant argument, we are going to remain unchanged, because we’ll have no choice. It’s simply the way we are. If he’s unable to hurdle this obstacle, then his argument is about as meaningful and effective as one that tells us why we shouldn’t be hungry.

I don’t know much about biology, but it seems that something along the lines of this second challenge—that we might have a natural affinity for helping others—could be tested. Would that not potentially shut the door on Nietzsche? Any biology people out there that can shed some light?

A move toward 'radical faith'

Last class I brought up my concern about Kierkegaard's belief in faith being a push toward radical movements, such as suicide bombings and whatnot. (In other words, the justification of insane actions through religion, not a new concept) The class seemed to kind of push this idea aside, saying that these acts of violence are not the same as the test of faith that Abraham was put through. The argument seemed to me to be that God asked for a violent act to be carried out by Abraham, yet did not make him carry it out, thus God does not ask for REAL acts of violence. But Kierkegaard argues very vehemently that this is an isolated incident, that each act of faith is completely individual and that none [other than the faithful in question... maybe] will understand or experience the same test. So then my question is, how can we in any way shape or form make claims on what God will or will not ask of his faithful? I would offer the obscure movie Sunshine [2007, its really good I recommend it] if I thought that it would help my point at all, yet as most have probably never heard of this movie, I will support my claim with a much more controversial but better known incident. Please do not be offended if this example hits too close to home, that is not its intention.

Imagine that Osama Bin Laden himself had ascended the Ethical sphere, and now gained an absolute relation with the absolute. For the sake of my argument, imagine that then God charged Osama with a seemingly impossible task. Perhaps it would happen something like this:

God [Allah]: Osama, I have been very impressed with your devotion to me and the law that governs my people. I now have a task designed specifically for you. Will you serve me in this difficult charge that I lay before you?

Osama Bin Laden: I am here Allah, as you command, I will do.

God: I am pleased with your answer. Now in the western lands of my creation, my children have forgotten the path to heaven. They obsess over the trivial materialistic experiences that 'life' has to offer. I charge you to awaken within them their dormant spirits. Can you do this for me Osama?

Osama Bin Laden: Tell me the process of awakening and it shall be as you will it.

God: You must create an elite group of warriors willing to sacrifice themselves to me. Lead them to attack the land's most valued governmental buildings. Do this in such a way that eliminates the lives of many, and destroys the families of more. This act will awaken the slumbering spirit of this immoral nation, and when all has been carried out, there will be peace in the land like never before.

And after Osama carried out his plans, almost completely successfully, America felt a great grief for its lost brethren. With nowhere else to look, the nation came together, and began to pray. And for a short time [no matter how brief] there was a nation wide peace, that was unlike anything the young country had ever experienced... [Epilogue: Until all hell broke loose several days later and people began wrongfully accusing any middle eastern families of being affiliated with terrorists]

In this scenario [which I in no way support of believe in], Osama Bin Laden could be seen as a knight of faith, following God's orders, whether they were truly God's or just figments of his imagination coming to him in a dream, all of this is subjective and unknown, yet in Kierkegaard's understanding, as faith is so personal, it is possible that it was indeed an act of faith. So then my question is, doesn't this extreme definition of faith serve as a gateway into the extreme attempts to prove faith?

Either way, my answer is to seek out Nietzsche and kill God. That will solve the problem of faith f0r me I think :) haha. Just some thoughts [I hope you enjoyed my creative writing section of this blog, I thought it was kind of a fun experiment]

Absolute Relation with the Absolute

Lately I’ve been reading up on some Martin Buber and so I can’t help but see a relation to Buber’s work in everything I read. Obviously, Buber came after Kierkegaard, so the influence would move in the opposite direction, but I think exploring Buber’s ideas can help clarify parts of Fear and Trembling that have been a little fuzzy. One part that I’ve had a particularly hard time grasping is envisioning the kind of relationship that is formed between the individual and God when the ethical realm is suspended. Although we have been told that this relationship is “absolute” and it individualistic in nature, therefore it is not something one could really understand unless one is in absolute relation to God, Buber’s ideas might help us clarify what this “absolute” relationship is actually about.

Martin Buber (of Jewish roots) wrote I and Thou in 1923. This work focuses on the idea of “I,” that is, the self that we come to realize through relationship with other beings, and the two types of relationships in which the I can take part: I-It and I-Thou. The I-It relationship is one that Buber says the world around us is filled with. Every time that we enter into a relationship with an object or a person in an objective manner, we are viewing them as an It (this sounds a bit like Hegel). Through this relationship, we see ourselves as the I, the objective observer, experiencing the It. Buber says that an “experience” we have is always of an It. The I-It relation puts space between the two beings and the I only participates in the relationship with a part of its being.

The other type of relation, I-Thou, involved the whole being of the I. The I is, effectively, confronted by the Thou and looks immediately at it as a whole being. The I of this relationship is different from the I of the I-It; the I is encountering the Thou, offering its being to the other, and the distance between the two disappears. The Thou “fills the firmament” of the I and the I does not see it as a bunch of qualities or features, but as a whole being.

The absolute relation with the Absolute is something I liken to the relationship of the I-Thou. When the individual exists the ethical realm (which could effectively be seen as full of I-It relationships), the individual stands alone with God. The space between the individual and God, the mediation that existed through the ethical, disappears. God is the eternal Thou in which the I stands in relation.

Maybe this helps…