Is There a Teleological Suspension of...the Individual?

We talked a lot in class about how the story of Abraham includes a teleological suspension of the ethical. Let’s walk through it, mostly for my benefit of explaining it to myself. Abraham decides to sacrifice his son, Isaac, to God. Human sacrifice is one of the more blatant as well as attention-grabbing violations of the Ethical realm. But, because of his absolute relation to the absolute—that is, God directly speaking to him and telling him to do it—the entire ethical realm is suspended. Thus we call Abraham a knight of faith instead of a filicidal psychopath (though the latter is hands-down way more fun to say).
We also talked a great deal about the tragic hero, mostly how Kierkegaard contrasts him with the knight of faith. While the knight of faith’s actions cause a teleological suspension of the Ethical, it seems to me that the tragic hero’s actions cause a teleological suspension of the Individual. The tragic hero performs some noble deed that benefits the Universal realm, whether it be his country or village or bowling team, at the expense of the Individual realm. The tragic hero personally endures suffering that is at least in part undeserved. Example time!
Let’s go with Agamemnon for this one, not only because Kierkegaard mentions him in Fear and Trembling but also because his predicament is somewhat similar: he sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia to the Gods. However, his reason for doing so lies in the Universal. Slaying Iphigenia appeases the goddess Artemis and allows the Greek fleet to sail. In terms of the Individual realm alone, Agamemnon’s actions appear ludicrous. Killing one’s own daughter tends not to lie in one’s individual interests, at least not here. Most of the time it would lead to great emotional suffering and grief. But Agamemnon doesn’t do this for himself, he does it for the good of his country, so that the Achaean troops can sail to Troy. Even though he must endure great personal suffering in killing his own daughter, the citizens and troops of Greece benefit en masse, facilitating a war in which they do fairly well for themselves. This story therefore includes a teleological suspension of the Individual; Agamemnon’s actions transcend this realm and relate solely to the Universal. That’s why we (well, actually not we, since we didn’t benefit from Iphigenia getting summarily offed. Let’s go with the Greek people) call him a hero and man of valor instead of a filicidal masochist.
But we don’t get an absolute relation to the absolute here. The corresponding relation that I guess would exist in this example would be a Universal relation to the Universal? This is the part of the comparison for which I don’t really have an answer, and it’s also the part that starts to make my brain hurt. Therefore I’m going to stop writing. Peace.

Thoughts on Kierkegaard, Faith, and Morality

As we conclude our study of Kierkegaard, I’ve listed some loosely connected thoughts inspired from our reading and discussion. In considering Colin's post, I noticed an attentiveness for the implications of an idea upon the world, one that I did not share. His concern, though I disagree with it, seems grounded in the ethical; he is concerned with worldly consequence above all else. This is in line with how I envision myself thinking, yet in studying Kierkegaard, I question both whether I am ethical and what that should mean.

Our study of Fear and Trembling has helped me realize that I might have faith; faith in the existence of truth. While, as a philosophy major, I hope to "get beyond" this faith, such that I might find something a little more in line with understanding, faith is what I have now. In writing this, I find it genuinely hard to describe my thoughts on truth. Perhaps, as Hegel might suggest, it is because they themselves are untrue. Yet, as I have said, I toy with faith in truth, and it will take more than a Hegel to rid me of that. I believe that truth is ideal, even should it have problematic personal or social impact. This belief could be derived from practical morality, however, in the belief that the truth eventually becomes necessary and/or known. If it is more than simply practical ethics, it seems my belief in truth to be something close to faith.

While my belief in truth seemed to me close to faith, this to is not a particularly satisfying answer. Instead, we must recognize a basic element of the ethical (an moral system) – it has a basis. It seems to me what we call the ethical is a morality based on value for life (more specifically that of human beings). Is this base reasoned or defensible? It certainly seems practical, if not necessary. This is close to Sartre’s existential humanism. But can there be such an arbitrarily chosen basis for the universal (ethical)?

I have yet to find a basis for a universal that I find satisfying. All moral systems I’ve examined seem to boil down to a choice. Ultimately, I have been unable to view these choices as determined or morally loaded in themselves. While I can accept this, I think it provides a weaker basis for morality than most are comfortable with and shows faith to be less unique than Kierkegaard might suggest.

Faith and Community

I suppose this could have been a comment on Rush's excellent post, but I've had these ideas rolling around for a while and I'm gonna use them, dammit! Also, it might be a bit long-winded for a comment. In any case:

On Easter Sunday I went to my brother's church in Auburn, Alabama. For those of you unfamiliar with Alabama, Auburn is a college town in the middle of farm country. Said farm country is in the middle of Alabama, which is itself in the middle of the Bible Belt. Going to church in Alabama is like watching Fox News, except that churches make no claims about being "fair and balanced." Let's be clear: I'm an atheist, progressive "intellectual" with longass hair and facial piercings; I tend to feel out of place in churches (and Mississippi in general). That said, my brother's church is not like other churches. Here's their website (half of my family is in the banner photo—my brother's the guy who looks like Jesus). I showed up looking—and probably smelling—like a dive bar, but no one cared except my mom. There were no pews; the small congregation (even that word doesn't seem to fit) sat around tables. They're non-denominational, fairly progressive, and very interested in the human aspect of Christianity; the "about" section on their website states that they "dream of becoming a community of Jesus-focused, relationship-oriented, real, passionate, artistic, casual, laughing, compassionate, inviting, and involved people." What strikes me about that statement as well as the church service that I experienced is that "Jesus-focused" is a relatively small part of the community they're striving to foster. Granted, it's the primary part, but it's not the only part, and that's very important. Take "Jesus-focused" out of their mission statement and it sounds like a great art collective.

Accordingly, the question I kept asking myself was why do these people need a deity to have this sort of community? Why does God have to be the reason to care about other people and treat them well? Almost everything that I heard during the service was firmly situated within Kierkegaard's ethical, universal sphere, even the overtly "religious" stuff. Why? Because the religious sphere is incommunicable. An absolute relation to the absolute cannot be put into language; it cannot be conveyed to any other person (which is why I call shenanigans on Kierkegaard's leap of faith, but that's another post altogether). So what do churches do? They attempt to universalize the absolute, putting an ineffable relation into words. This is why Kierkegaard was so down on organized religion. It seems likely that his answer to my question would be that these folks don't need a deity to have their community; in fact, their community has little to do with a deity other than common belief.

But that's what a community is, right? A group of people who intentionally coexist due to similar beliefs. Most of the time, these beliefs dictate action; we do certain things in certain ways because we (as individuals or communities) hold certain beliefs, whether it's doing good deeds in return for eternal life in heaven or simply because good deeds are preferable to bad deeds (a sentiment Nietzsche questions as much as he questions religion). In critiquing any community, then, we either take issue with the central belief of that community or with the actions that the community promotes. Though I don't share the Christian belief in a god, I don't have a problem with the belief itself; it's the actions of the community—which take place in the universal, ethical realm—which are subject to critique, at least from my point of view. In the case of my brother's church, I have little issue to take with the actions they suggest—like I said, if they dropped the Jesus part of their mission, I'd be all for it. That seems to suggest that maybe the importance of religious experience (that is, the individual, absolute relation to the absolute) to this community is negligible, aside from its classificatory function. These folks don't care about each other because they all happen to believe in the same god; they care for each other on a very human level—and their care extends beyond their membership.

I suppose that this has been a rather roundabout way of saying that I think my brother's church is totally fine. But the point to be made is that faith, beyond its function of nominal classification, really has nothing to do with groups of people. Kierkegaard was wary of organized religion because it actually waters down faith, making it available to anyone who wishes to partake of it. What's more, the church makes this democratization an imperative: the very idea of evangelism is to bring others to faith—sometimes whether they like it or not. That's not faith; that's the creation and proliferation of power structures—which are certainly not divine.

Birds of Prey

I have always enjoyed Nietzsche’s concepts of the origins of good and evil as social constructs created by the weak. I’ll start with a brief summary of Nietzsche’s argument. In the Genealogy of Morals Friedrich Nietzsche argues that there is a difference between good/evil and good/bad and that the two concepts are opposed to each other. He argues that evil is a construct of slavish morality used by the priestly class to oppress those who are stronger than them; this “Slave Morality” is one of Nietzsche’s central ideas. Nietzsche believes that “Good” is not defined by the terms of the priestly class but rather “good” equals strength and power and is life affirming whereas the “Good” as the priestly class describes it is life denying and is focused on making oneself weaker for the sake of others. A key moment for me in his first essay is in section 13 where uses the analogy of the bird of prey and the lamb. He states that the Lambs dislike being in danger of being carried off by the bird of prey and therefor decides that the bird of prey is Evil; and if the bird of prey is evil it must follow that whatever is opposite of the bird of prey, the lamb, is Good. The Bird however does not draw these distinctions it does not see the lamb or itself as good or evil; the bird is merely utilizing its naturally given strength to acquire food it sees no moral issue in what it is doing at all. The lamb however is demanding that the bird not utilize its strength because since its strength harms lambs it is evil; they are trying to “make the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.” As if it should feel guilty for doing what comes naturally to it. I find this argument very intriguing and Nietzsche’s entire argument against the so called priestly class is very persuasive. Nietzsche’s argument makes the morality that is commonly followed a product of the church and as such part of the Christianity. However the slave morality is intrinsic to Christianity they are inseparable and to remove the morality is to have Christianity crumble. Nietzsche believed that one should focus on self-preserving life affirming ideas and create their own morality and become what he called the Übermensch. While this concept is not directly mentioned in the Genealogy of Morals it is key to Nietzsche’s philosophy and serves as the opposite of the follower of slave morality; a being that creates their own morality and is not oppressed by the weak they do what they see as right not because they are told to but because they think it is right.

Marx and Nietzsche: Christianity as the disease of man

One aspect of philosophy I really enjoy is the connections and similarities of philosophers and philosophies. These similarities or connections are more common in parallel strains of philosophy, but can also crop up in starkly different philosophies. One such similarity is the perspective of Christianity as a disease that infects human kind and that limits and restrains them.

Marx and Nietzsche, while focusing on very different things in their works, share in common their mistrust of Christianity, and their opinion of its deleterious effects. Marx focuses on the universal, on the class struggle, while Nietzsche is concerned with the individual. Marx finds Christianity to be an ensnaring illusion which propagates capitalism, while Nietzsche views Christianity as a vengeful reordering of values. When viewed side by side, Marx’s and Nietzsche’s views of Christianity illuminate certain similarities that stand out amongst their slight dissimilarities.

Marx primarily views Christianity as a trap that tricks people into willingly falling into it. The Christian bible encourages subservience through teachings such as “the first shall be last and the last shall be first”, and “turn the other cheek”. A core concept of the bible is that there is an afterlife in which the immortal souls of people will be rewarded or punished according to how they acted during their life. Teachings such as these discourage revolution, in part because of morally dubious acts that revolutions involve like killing and “stealing” of property, and partly because the importance of what one has during their life is significantly less if there is much greater rewards in an afterlife. The ultimate consequence of these teachings is that the lower classes are repressed by their own hand and refuse to rise up and free themselves.

Nietzsche views Christianity as the perfection, the final fruition, of the vengeful inversion of values instigated by the Jews. Nietzsche writes “from the trunk of that tree of vengefulness and hatred… capable of creating ideals and reversing values… grew something equally incomparable, a new love, the profoundest and sublimest kind of love.”(34) In the metaphor he uses the vengeful hate of the Jews as a trunk, and Christianity is a crown of the trunk that spreads out into the light seducing people like the trunk of hate could never do. Nietzsche claims that Jesus of Nazareth is the bypass through which the vengeful hate is fulfilled. He claims that Jesus is the incarnation of love, the redeemer, the savior of the weak and of the sinners; the irresistible seduction, the bate that lures people in.

In viewing these two perspectives of Christianity side by side the differences become apparent, but the similarities are also flushed out. Both Marx and Nietzsche have a strong dislike of Christianity, but I think that for Nietzsche the problem of Christianity is much more central, acute, and pernicious. Marx sees Christianity as one element that promotes capitalism, one issue among many. However, for Nietzsche Christianity is representative of the central problem, the inversion of values, the root of the problem, the perfection of the vengeful hate.

Modern Faith?

Our study of Kierkegaard has undoubtedly provided us with a stronger, if not better case for faith. For me, accepting faith is made easiest when presented from an existential point of view. Clearly this is what Kierkegaard does so well, as he emphasizes the individual importance of faith. Additionally, what’s better is how faith can now be understood for what it is, and not for what we make it be. Meaning faith, as we read in Kierkegaard, is no longer limited to be only a part of the religious experience, but rather a religious experience itself (I don’t mean religious as something affiliated with a certain denomination or practice, but rather as Kierkegaard intended by that which supersedes the universal).

However, in closing our study of Kierkegaard, I’ve discovered a personal concern that I find impelled to expresses. What is modern faith and more importantly what does modern faith look like? This is something that poses a big concern for me, as my refined understanding of faith (thanks to Kierkegaard) lacks a modern application of faith (thanks to Kierkegaard). Fortunately Kierkegaard provides us with an appropriate story of true faith in Fear and Trembling (i.e. Abraham and Isaac), but unfortunately, I don’t know of another case where true faith is exemplified, at least according to Kiekegaardian faith. This leads me to question then how true faith manifest itself today? If my understanding of faith is on par with Kierkegaard’s, then I want to believe someone who says God told him/her to murder his/her only child, yet obviously I cannot and I would even question whether or not that person indeed experienced an act of faith.

One of the common arguments against Kierkegaard’s conception of faith is that faith is limited only to the one experiencing it. In part this leaves all others excluded from that one persons act of faith. Thus because of faith’s high relativity, it cannot be accepted as something sound and worthwhile. Yet this is exactly what Kierkegaard is refuting by saying that faith is purely relative and not meant to be understood within the confines of humankind’s universal conception of ethics or morality.

Although Kierkegaard’s argument for faith is highly compelling, its frustrating to find a modern application (i.e. not biblical) of faith. My point is not to discredit faith, but find a legitimate starting point in pursing faith. Yet is this possible in a society where faith is so frowned upon for its relative nature. Perhaps, I’m more confused with faith than I am convinced.

Still Clinging to Dialectic

As confounded as I was when I first read Hegel, I still have yet to encounter a better alternative from the post-Hegelian writers that we have encountered in this class. Sure he is almost incomprehensible at times, but I believe he deserves the most merit in attempting a scientific philosophy. Even if conscious is frustrated at times, these feelings seem much more applicable than unmediated relations to the Absolute from Kierkegaard. I have to side with Hegel’s suggestion that the ineffable, in this case faith, is simply untrue. If it cannot be relayed in terms we can understand, then it isn’t true. Ironically, I take this to be the main point from Fear and Trembling; by trying to explain or make faith more expensive, Johannes has only revealed that it just refused to be translated into intelligible terms. I can handle the extreme sense of uniqueness that faith encompasses, but why must it come at the cost of traditional philosophy? If faith is to be made more expensive through the prevailing message that Johannes, why does he have to throw previous philosophical works under the bus? While I applaud his categorization of the ethical, aesthetic, and religious realms, it still leaves much to be desired, especially if the ethical realm can be suspended for these unmediated interactions. And if these unexplainable interactions are supposed to be the richest of experiences, it leaves much more to be desired, seeing as how they are largely intelligible and unable to be related to other consciousnesses. Things of the ethical realm still need to be explored and placed at a premium, because it seems that everyone must participate under these conditions, as not everyone will engage in religious realms because it seems very central to Christianity, which not everyone practices. So, why does Johannes spend so much attention to the ineffable? I guess I am not one for miracles, as I feel more attention needs to be paid to what can be understood by others. As stylized as Kierkegaard’s works are, he seems stuck in the sense-certainty when faith is considered, and maybe faith shouldn’t be that important because there are more pressing matters at hand. Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling emits this sense of escapism, because of his religious affiliation, and it frustrates me that someone with this much insight would dedicate so much effort towards something that cannot, and as he argues, shouldn’t be expressed (which s the problem with the constant preaching of the Abraham narrative in the first place).