Sunday, March 28, 2010
Possible Connections
What is it about Fear and Trembling that makes it a particularly philosophical work? Does it not seem more in line with a sort of religious self-help text? The work seems more indicative of a novel, given the attention to style and metaphor, and admittance on the narrator’s part that he is limited when it comes to the intricacies of philosophical debate. However, in bringing back a dear, old friend, G.W.F. Hegel, I find a possible connection between the two. In a sense, the faith seems comparable to gut feelings from Hegel, although Kierkegaard has an explicit tie to God, whereas Hegel would not give a particular identity of his Absolute. While Hegel was more focused on a humanistic, and scientific approach to philosophy, his section on morality is particularly baffling, especially with the miraculously healed hardened heart of the beautiful soul. It seems like Kierkegaard, through Johannes de Silencio, works from a similar model, as the beautiful soul is akin to those merely going off the Abraham narrative and not experiencing faith. The beautiful soul resembles the masses blindly accepting that act of faith and making it his/her own model without fully comprehending the absurdity. Action seems to play a key role in both models of morality, as the beautiful soul is at odds with an acting conscience, which engages in the world instead of merely judging it. Likewise, faith can only be comprehended by some type of engagement with the absurd, and ultimately coming to grips with certain contradictions; like how Abraham had to fully believe he would sacrifice Isaac, but at the same time expecting to see him again. The element of engaging absurdity, rather than disembodied judgment bears heavily on both Hegel and Kierkegaard’s sense of morality, but I am still not completely sold that they have articulated a plausible alternative to Kant’s categorical imperative, from a logical standpoint. Yes, disinterested judgments arising from rationality sense highly unlikely, but seem much more plausible to have a common standard for all to share, rather than all of the factors in engaging with the absurd. Of course, Kierkegaard would languish my decision, as I am preferring standards of the ethical realm, but it seems more desirable to have an appeal to all of humanity, not just isolated cases of absurdity that by definition should not be intelligible to others that are not directly experiencing the situation in question.
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I might be wrong, but I don't think Kierkegaard's work up to this point (just the preface and the first problema) has attempted to offer a complete system of moral interaction capable of replacing Kant's. In other words, in response to your objection—that he still has not articulated a plausible alternative to Kant’s categorical imperative from a logical standpoint—I don't think he's tried to. It seems to me that we're dealing with a special case when we're talking about faith... a rare scenario in which the ethical (whatever normal moral system we choose to adhere to) is suspended. Why rare? Because it isn't everyday that God demands us to break our moral laws.
ReplyDeleteI realize that he is offering an objection to the moral standard (in terms of the ethical realm), but I feel that it still is similar to Hegel's discussion of the beautiful soul and acting conscience. I know he explicitly doesn't offer it as an alternative to Kant, I feel that an answered garnered with respect to the ethical is the most viable.
ReplyDeleteI think you bring up some interesting points, but don't you think Kant's categorical imperative also has a bit of an engagement with absurdity also, more specifically in the caveat of duty. Doesn't an individual acting rightly because it is his duty to do the right thing have a detachment from his natural inclinations? Because Kant would say that someone who acting rightly out of duty instead of out of his inclinations would really be acting in "the most-right" way (to make up some words.)
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