In the Introduction, Marx lays out what he thinks are the preconditions for an emancipating revolt in Germany. Two of these conditions particularly struck me. The first is that “a class must be formed…which does not claim a particular redress because the wrong which is done to it is not a particular wrong but wrong in general” (64), and the second is that this class will find its “intellectual weapons in philosophy” (65). While Marx explicitly limits this social explanation to Germany prior to the 20th century, the fact that this work is still relevant more than a decade and a half after it was written suggests that at least someone thinks it’s more generally applicable. Thus, I don’t think it’s ridiculous to consider potential hindrances that reveal themselves once one considers this wider application.
To my knowledge, Marx never makes explicit whether or not these conditions are simply sufficient for revolution to take place or absolutely necessary. Based on the tone of the essay, I think its safe to assume the latter and, if we make this assumption, two concepts must be considered: solidarity (regarding the first claim) and education (regarding the second).
The first claim implies that there are universal wrongs that most people (perhaps around the world) find objectionable. While I do think these exist in rare cases, a lot of situations of oppression involve more conditional wrongs. In these cases, in order for the wrong to be looked at as a wrong against, not just the particular group, but rather all of humanity, there must be a great deal of solidarity between the oppressed and other outside groups. Obviously there are many barriers that prevent this from happening, and I think one of those is physical appearance. We likely feel more natural sympathy for those who look like us because we can more easily see ourselves in their shoes. Therefore, in many cases, solidarity between fellow countrymen, who are often times the same race, is easier to achieve than solidarity between people from different parts of the world. In short, what I’m trying to say is that this Marxian condition is probably much easier to achieve in a national scenario—such as Germany—than in an international one.
The second claim stresses the importance of education for the oppressed group. Philosophy, nowadays, seems to be the exclusive property of intellectuals. The way many modern societies are set up, these intellectuals are not typically members of the oppressed group. The type of oppression Marx talks about entails poverty, and one of the many horrors of poverty is a lack of education. Without education, how are the oppressed supposed to use an academic subject matter like philosophy as a weapon?
I agree with the thoughts on solidarity, as it seems unlikely to unite the oppression in an international sense, as it always seems more conditional than widespread. As for education, perhaps Marx does not mean philosophy in the strict sense that one must be formally educated from Pre-Socratic thought all the way to Hegel and then Marx, but possibly a more practical conception of criticism that would arise from the feelings of alienation. Since Marx criticizes interpretation merely for the sake of interpretation, he could be calling for a critical attitude which could take the form of philosophy.
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