Monday, February 1, 2010

Hegel and Truth

The Preface and Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit deal extensively with knowledge, a central theme of the text. Hegel shies (or rather, elects to abstain) from proving the efficacy in reason, which to some might appear negligent. However, this omission is fairly excusable even should you disagree with his dismissal of basic epistemological concerns on the simple grounds of expediency. More important to reading the Phenomenology is Hegel’s theory of truth.

Hegel clearly looks to the whole for truth. It becomes clear the whole at which he is looking is historically expansive while anchored in Hegel’s monist unity. Still, grasping Hegel’s concept of truth has proved a significant task I have yet to comfortably resolve. The following quote from the Phenomenology gets at the nuanced conception of truth Hegel held:

“True and false belong among those determinate notions which are held to be inert and wholly separate essences, one here and one there, each standing fixed and isolated from the other, with which it has nothing in common. Against this view it must be maintained that truth is not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made. Nor is there such a thing as the false, any more than there is something evil.”

Perhaps easier than directly gleaning Hegel’s conception of truth from the text would be examining a common conception of truth in relation to Hegel. A common theory of truth is adherence to an objective world (either directly or through such a mediator as a proposition). When a detective grills a suspect for the truth, they are working toward an understanding of presumably objective events through a singular account of someone who experienced it. While working towards an objective account, the detective must also determine whether their suspect’s statement itself is true. While the truth of the suspect’s statement might also be weighed in its accordance to an objective reality, it can as easily be measured by adherence to what that suspect actually believes. This standard of truth doesn’t require an objective reality experienced by all, though it could easily render the detective useless: their case could quickly become filled with seemingly contradictory “truths.” It would seem Hegel’s truth of a crime would be an understanding of the perceptions of all those involved in the crime and perhaps even their motives, as they are a distinct and strong force upon what happened. However, I am unsure if this painting of a search for truth in a crime scene would merit even a glance from Hegel. Is there an underlying truth to a series of events, or are they merely particulars imposed by man upon a shared experience? Ultimately, I do think Hegel would find such a truth, if only from my knowledge of the importance he placed upon history. Other conceptions of truth also lend themselves to Hegel. More pragmatic notions of truth, such as Charles Sanders Peirce conception of truth as that which is guaranteed not to conflict with experience, echo of Hegel’s dismissal of inquiries into the effectiveness and limits of knowledge. Other conceptions of truth hold it as more a convention or product of language than a natural occurrence.

I found this entry an interesting read on truth theory.

1 comment:

  1. Hegel does look to the whole truth, for the reason of connecting a series of causes and effects into an event as a whole. This is in fact a key element in what separates Hegel's view of events from most other philosophers. However, im not sure what the latter section concerning how Hegel would view a crime is getting at. It seems that you are giving an example of how Hegel would view any event. If this is the case i think that Hegel would view the truth of the crime much as you said, as all of the parts acting and reacting together once the entire event has been completed.

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